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Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
Criminal Trespass
Three 1960 statutes provided for a re-definition or expansion
of the crime of criminal trespass. Act 458 is a comprehensive
elaboration of the criminal trespass article of the Criminal Code,'
providing a dual definition of criminal trespass. Under subsec-
tion D, now applicable only in nine specified parishes, 2 the orig-
inal Criminal Code definition and penalty is retained. Elsewhere
in the state the new and more complicated trespass law 3 is to
apply. The principal difference between the new general defi-
nition of subsection A and the nine-parish former definition of
subsection D is the addition of clause (2) (a) under which tres-
pass may be committed upon a posted but not enclosed plot of
ground, provided it exceeds one acre and is not situated in an
open range. Under the comparable provision of original Article
93 and subsection D of the new law, the land trespassed upon
must be "enclosed and posted." (Emphasis added.) The old re-
quirement of "enclosed and posted" still applies where the plot
is less than an acre or is an open range area.
Subsection C provides a graduated penalty clause, making a
distinction as to first, second, and third offenders. It applies
only to the new general criminal trespass crime of subsection A,
and the original penalty clause is retained in subsection D for
the nine specified parishes. The flexibility of the original pen-
alty clause was much more in keeping with modern theories of
judicial discretion and individualization in sentencing than is the
arbitrary penalty pattern of subsection C.
Elaborate definitions in subsection B of the basic terms
"posted" and "enclosed" should serve to clarify application of
the law. They will provide a more definite guide for the land-
owner who desires to bar hunters and other trespassers from his
property.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:63 (Supp. 1960).
2. Allen, Beauregard, Grant, LaSalle, Livingston, St. Helena, Vernon, Winn,
and Sabine parishes.
3. Subsection A defines the crime of trespass; while subsection C provides a
graduated penalty clause for first, second, and third offenders.
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Act 3884 makes it a rather serious misdemeanor for anyone
other than the owner, lessee, or their duly authorized representa-
tive to place posted signs on property. Act 3858 provides penal-
ties for the unauthorized destruction, defacing, or removal of
"posted" or boundary signs. Both of these statutes implement
the general effectiveness of posting property for criminal tres-
pass purposes.
Miscellaneous Criminal Statutes
Act 544 amends the flag desecration article of the Criminal
Code6 so as to expand the definition of "flag" to include the Con-
federate flag, as well as the flags of the United States and the
State of Louisiana.
Act 550 enlarges the crime of illegal use of weapons7 by add-
ing "the discharging or firing of a rifle of a caliber of 22 or
larger across navigable streams in this state" to the list of pro-
hibited activities.
Act 505 makes two changes in a 1954 statute8 which pun-
ished encouraging or contributing to child delinquency. In sub-
section B of that statute the phrase "drinking beverages of low
alcoholic content or beverages of high alcoholic content" was sub-
stituted for "drinking intoxicating liquor." This change was ap-
parently aimed at avoiding the limitation of State v. Viator,9
where the phrase "intoxicating or spirituous liquors" (emphasis
added) in the Criminal Code crime of unlawful sales to minors10
was construed as embracing only whiskey and other distilled bev-
erages, as distinguished from beer and other fermented bever-
ages of low alcoholic content. A second change was the elimina-
tion of "going into a place where intoxicating liquors or nar-
cotics are kept, drunk, used, sold or given away" from the defi-
nition of "delinquency" in subsection B. This phrase was unduly
broad in view of the fact that package liquor is kept and sold in
many drug stores and groceries, which are hardly to be charac-
terized as dens of iniquity. However, the deletion of the entire
phrase may be questioned, since places where intoxicants are
4. L&. R.$. 14:63.1 (Supp. 1960).
5. LA. R.S. 14:63.2 (Supp. 1960).
6. LA. R.S. 14:116 (Supp. 1960).
7. LA. R.S. 14:94 (Supp. 1960).
8. LA. R.S. 14:92.1 (Supp. 1960).
9. 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956).
10. LA. R.$. 14:91 (Supp. 1960).
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used or consumed should be in the out-of-bounds area for chil-
dren.
Act 488, aimed at strengthening the Uniform Narcotic Drug
Law in Louisiana," has amended the definition of "narcotic
drugs' 1 2 by adding methadone, alphaprodine, levorphanol, an-
steridine, levomethorphan, and phenamicine, and by providing
definitions of those new terms.'3
Morality Laws - Obscenity
Three 1960 statutes, drafted and sponsored by the Legisla-
ture's Joint Sex Crime Study Committee, will serve to strengthen
Louisiana's anti-obscenity laws. Act 199 amends the obscenity
article14 of the Criminal Code which had recently been declared
unconstitutional, on the ground of vagueness and indefiniteness,
in State v. Christine.15 Amended Article 106 goes into great de-
tail in particularizing the prescribed criminal conduct -all of
which is specifically directed toward "arousing sexual desires"
or toward primarily appealing to "the prurient interest of the
average person." The specification and enumeration employed in
Act 199 would not ordinarily be considered good drafting, since
the use of broad all-embracive terms provides more complete
coverage and avoids inadvertent loopholes. However, in the field
of morality crimes where standards of conduct vary so greatly
between individuals or groups of individuals, and in view of the
strict construction of the obscenity article in the Christine case,
the detailed elaboration is justified as a means of seeking to pro-
vide an attack-proof obscenity law. It is significant to note that
obscenity is defined as the "intentional" exposure, production,
display, etc. Thus, under the general provision of Article 11 of
the Criminal Code a general criminal intent is required, and
under Article 16 reasonable ignorance or mistake of fact which
precludes a guilty mind will be a defense.
Act 200 implements obscenity law enforcement by creating
the new crime of letting premises for obscenity.'6 This statute is
drafted in conformity with the analogous Criminal Code offense
of letting premises for prostitution, 7 and makes the letting of
11. LA. R.S. 40:961-984 (Supp. 1960).
12. LA. R.S. 40:961(19) (Supp. 1960).
13. Id., clauses (10) through (15).
14. LA. R.S. 14:106 (Supp. 1960).
15. 239 La. 259, 118 So.2d 403 (1960), noted page 264 infra.
16. LA. R.S. 14:85.1 (Supp. 1960).
17. LA. R.S. 14:85 (1950).
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premises for purposes of obscenity a misdemeanor with a maxi-
mum possible penalty of a fine of $500.00 or six months im-
prisonment, or both.
Act 201 amends the padlocking law'8 so as to declare the car-
rying on of obscenity to be a nuisance, and subject to injunction
and abatement.19
Time Limitations
Act 25, providing a completely new system of time limitations
on criminal prosecutions, is probably the most significant 1960
statute in the field of criminal law and procedure. This statute,
drafted by the Louisiana State Law Institute as a part of its
work on a revision of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
was put in statute form, for pre-code enactment to meet an
urgent need for immediate relief in this confused area of the
law. It replaces the much-amended and litigated Articles 8
and 9 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, which are re-
pealed except as to prosecutions already instituted and prescrip-
tions already accrued at the effective date of the new law. 20 As
under the 1928 Code, the new law provides for two major time
limitations. Sub-part A2 1 provides for limitations upon the insti-
tution of prosecutions; while sub-part B2 2 provides time limita-
tions upon commencement of the trial after the prosecution is
instituted.
A significant feature of the new limitations upon the insti-
tution of prosecutions is the abolition of the so-called "made
known" test. Under Article 8 of the 1928 Code the prosecution
must be instituted, as to most crimes, within one year after the
commission of the offense "shall have been made known" to the
appropriate judge, district attorney, or grand jury. This lan-
guage had been construed to mean that the period ran from the
time the offense should have been known by the court or prose-
cuting authorities; and this formula injected great uncertainty
into the law.23 New Section 7.2, in accordance with the prepon-
18. LA. R.S. 13:4711 (Supp. 1960).
19. LA. R.S. 13:4711 through 4717 (Supp. 1960).
20. LA. Acts 1960, No. 25, § 2.
21. LA. R.S. 15:7.1-7.7 (Supp. 1960).
22. LA. R.S. 15:7.8-7.12 (Supp. 1960).
23. State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793 (1941) wherein there was a
factual divergence between the majority and dissenting opinions as to whether the
district attorney should have known of the defendant's embezzlement of the parish
funds entrusted to him.
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
derant weight of authority, the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, 24 and the federal prescription statute,2 5 states a time
limitation, for the institution of prosecution by indictment or in-
formation, which runs from the commission of the offense - a
time that can be clearly and easily determined. The new time
limitation is necessarily longer than the former one-year period
which did not begin to run until the prosecution had actual or
constructive notice of the defendant's crime. The limitation of
Section 7.2, similar to the American Law Institute and federal
limitations upon which it is based, is graduated from a two-year
period for misdemeanors to a six-year period for major fel-
onies. 26
There are certain types of felonies where the offender is in a
position to conceal his crime, as where a public officer or other
fiduciary misappropriates money and continues in office or pub-
lic bribery is committed. Section 7.3, based upon Section 1.07
(3a-3b) of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, pro-
vides that in these specified situations the time limitations will
not run "until the relationship or status involved has ceased to
exist."
In accordance with the general policy that the book is never
closed on such heinous crimes as murder or aggravated rape,
Section 7.1 provides that there is no time limitation on the insti-
tution of prosecution for capital crimes .2 7 Article 8 of the 1928
Code had also included aggravated burglary, aggravated arson,
and armed robbery in the list of non-prescribable offenses. Sec-
tion 7.4 continues the sound rule of Article 8 of the 1928 Code of
Criminal Procedure that the exemption of non-prescribable
crimes also applies to lesser and included offenses which may be
responsive verdicts. Thus, if the non-prescriptible offense of
murder is charged, a verdict of manslaughter would be appropri-
ate even though the time limitation had run upon the institution
of a prosecution for an independent charge of manslaughter.
The fundamental principle that time should not run in favor
of a defendant who has absconded or fled in order to avoid de-
tection or prosecution is stated in Section 7.5, which treats such
24. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, Sec. 1.07 (1956).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282, 3288 and 3289.
26. LA. R.S. 15:7.3 (Supp. 1960). Accord: ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, TENTA-
TIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 1.07 (3a-3b).
27. LA. R.S. 15:7.1 (Supp. 1960). Accord: ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, TENTA-
TIVE ])RAFT No. 5, page 17.
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conduct as an interruption of the time limitation. A similar pro-
vision has been part of every Louisiana statute since 1805,28 and
is found in the American Law Institute Model Penal Code.29
Where a prosecution has been instituted and the indictment
subsequently nolle prosequied, or the charge dismissed by the
court by reason of some defect or deficiency, Section 7.6 permits
the state to bring a new charge within the original time limita-
tion, or within six months after the dismissal, whichever is
longer. This provision is more explicit than a comparable pro-
vision in Article 8 of the 1928 Code, and also contains an express
proviso that the nolle prosequi must not have been "entered for
the purpose of avoiding the time limitation for the commence-
ment of trial in Section 7.8."
Section 7.7 provides specific rules as to the time and manner
in which time limitations are to be pleaded, a matter which was
very inadequately covered in the 1928 Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. It retains the concept that the plea may be raised at any
time,3 0 but changes the existing law when it states that the plea
may be raised "only once, and shall be tried by the court alone." 3'
The fundamental right of the accused to a speedy trial is im-
plemented by the limitations upon trial set out in sub-part B.82
Section 7.8 continues the rule, which had previously been conf us-
ingly handled in part of Articles 8 and 9 of the 1928 Code, that
the trial must be commenced with reasonable expedition, i.e.,
capital cases within three years from the institution of the prose-
cution by indictment, other felony cases within two years, and
misdemeanor cases within one year. The confusion resulting
from the involved wording and overlapping provision of Articles
8 and 9 as to the three-year time limitation had forcibly pointed
up the need for a clearly drafted series of articles providing for
the period, not periods, within which the accused must be
brought to trial.33
28. Crimes Act of 1805, § 37; Revised Statutes 1870, § 986; LA. R.S. 15:8
(Supp. 1960).
29. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 1.07 (6a).
30. State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942) where plea was filed
before trial; State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939) where the time
limitation was raised after trial and conviction.
31. See State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 So. 631 (1925).
32. LA. R.S. 15:7.8-7.12 (Supp. 1960).
33. In State v. Bradley, 227 La. 421, 79 So.2d 561 (1955), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held, and not without logical support from the involved wording
of Articles 8 and 9, that there were two three-year prescriptive periods- (1) a
three-year period created by Article 8, which started to run with the filing of the
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A distinction between those causes which will interrupt and
those which will merely suspend the running of the time limita-
tion for the commencement of trial is clearly drawn in Sections
7.9 and 7.10, respectively. Those causes which preclude any pro-
ceedings in the case, such as the fact that the accused is a fugi-
tive from justice or cannot be brought to trial because of present
insanity, will interrupt the time limitations which "shall com-
mence to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no
longer exists."3 4 The time limitation is suspended, rather than
interrupted, during delays occasioned by the court's ruling on
preliminary pleasA5 In this situation the time before the filing
of the plea is counted and may be tacked to time accruing after
the court's ruling to determine if the time limitation has run. In
order always to allow the state a reasonable time after the ruling
on the plea to reset the case for trial, Section 7.10 expressly pro-
vides "but in no case shall the state have less than one year after
the ruling to commence the trial."
Section 7.12 is a new provision, which has been appropriately
characterized in the Reporter's Comment as "an administrative
necessity." It states that where a new trial is granted or a mis-
trial declared the state shall always have at least one year to
commence the trial irrespective of the fact that the regular
period for commencement of trial may have expired.
Commitment in Case of Acquittal by Reason of Insanity
The 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for
further disposition of a case where a defendant was acquitted on
the ground of insanity at the time of the crime. 36 Under general
provisions of the Mental Health Law s7 the court was empowered
to, and usually did, order the defendant committed. However,
indictment, and (2) another three-year period, created by Article 9, which ran
from the last prosecutive step, which was the arraignment in the Bradley case.
Carrying the concept of two three-year prescriptive periods even further; Justice
Hawthorne's opinion in the Bradley case suggested that the trial judge might
have discretion as to whether the charge should be nolle prosequied at the end
of the prescriptive period set out in Article 8, but that there was no discretion
as to the three-year period provided in Article 9. State v. Truett, 230 La. 955,
89 So.2d 754 (1956), followed the Bradley decision, but a number of additional
difficulties were raised in the course of the Truett rehearings and dissenting
opinions.
34. LA. R.S. 15:7.9 (Supp. 1960).
35. LA. 1.S. 15:7.10 (Supp. 1960).
36. Under LA. R.S. 15:412.1 (Supp. 1960) (origination in R.S.,. 1870, § 995)
when the jury acquits "on account of insanity they shall, in giving their verdict
of not guilty, state that it was for this cause."
37. LA. R.S. 28:59 (1950).
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this provision was permissive, not mandatory; and it also neces-
sitated regular commitment procedures. Act 509 of 1960, in ac-
cordance with the practice in England and ten American juris-
dictions, provides for automatic commitment to a state mental
institution of a person who is charged with a capital crime and
acquitted on the ground of insanity.
In explaining a similar provision in Section 4.08(1) of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, the Reporter states,
"Automatic commitment not only provides the public with maxi-
mum immediate protection, but may also work to the advantage
of mentally diseased or defective defendants by making the de-
fense of irresponsibility more acceptable to the public and to the
jury."83
While the new Louisiana provision for automatic commitment
is a definite step in the right direction, it would have been even
better if Act 509 had more fully spelled out the procedures to be
followed if the defendant subsequently regains his sanity. The
American Law Institute commitment rule is followed by compre-
hensive provisions as to a subsequent determination of the de-
fendant's fitness to return to society, 39 and provisions for safe-
guarding society, by a system of probation, against dangers from
a possible reoccurrence of the mental instability.4° The proce-
dures of Louisiana's general mental health law will scarcely suf-
fice in these regards. Also, the limitation of Act 509 to acquit-
tals in capital cases is unwise; for the habitual offender who is
acquitted of a non-capital, but dangerous, felony also presents a
very real present danger to society.
Suspended Sentence and Probation
Act 360, a statute prepared by the "Forgotten Man Committ-
tee," revises suspended sentence and probation procedures, incor-
porating many features of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code4 1 and of the Standard Probation and Parole Act pre-
pared by the National Probation and Parole Association. The
new law continues Louisiana's present policy of providing separ-
ately for suspension of sentence and probation in felony42 and in
misdemeanor 4 3 cases; but it provides for situations which were
38. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, at 199 (1955).
39. Ibid.
40. Id. § 4.08(2), (3) and (5).
41. Id. § 4.08(3) and (4).
42. LA. 15:530-535 (Supp. 1960).
43. L&. R.S. 15:536-538 (Supp. 1960).
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not covered, or very inadequately treated, in the existing law.
Section 530 gives the sentencing judge a free hand to adapt the.
type of sentence to the case at bar. He may suspend the imposi-
tion of sentence or impose sentence immediately and suspend its
execution, and in either case he may place the defendant on pro-
bation under supervision. Following the prevailing view, the
court is authorized to impose conditions on the suspension of sen-
tence or admission to probation. Clause B, patterned after Sec-
tion 301.1 (2) of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,
provides a list of conditions which the court may impose. These
specified permissive conditions, based upon the composite experi-
ence of the draftsmen and advisors for the American Law Insti-
tute Code, and tempered by a careful analysis by the Louisiana
drafting committee, will serve as a valuable guide for the sen-
tencing judge. In addition to nine specified conditions, any of
which may be imposed, the sentencing judge is assured of com-
plete freedom to adapt the conditions to the needs of the case by
a residual clause granting broad authority to impose "any other
specific conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation."' 4 Addi-
tional flexibility is afforded by the court's authority, under Sec-
tion 533, to modify or add to the conditions originally imposed.
Section 530 continues the prior limitation that the period of
the suspended sentence or probation shall not exceed five years.
Writing concerning a similar limitation in Section 301.2 of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, the Reporter states,
"We think that 5 years in the case of felonies ... should suffice
to serve the ends of a conditional suspension or probation, with-
out overburdening the limited facilities for supervision that must
be employed. Since these periods may prove unnecessary in some
cases, we provide that the defendant may be discharged sooner
by the court." '45 Louisiana's amended suspended sentence and
probation law similarly provides, in Section 533, that the court
may order the defendant's discharge "at any time after the ex-
piration of one year of probation or suspended sentence," thus
providing an added incentive to the defendant to achieve a
prompt rehabilitation.
Section 535 provides that upon completion of the period of
suspended sentence or probation "the defendant shall have satis-
44. LA. R.S. 15:530 B(10) (Supp. 1960).
45. AL MODEL PENAL CODE, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, at 147, Comment to§ 301.3 (1955).
(Vol. XX!
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fied his sentence." Thus no formal discharge, such as was re-
quired under the prior law,46 is necessary.
Section 531 continues the provision authorizing the trial court
to order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant's back-
ground, physical and mental health, and all pertinent informa-
tion concerning the circumstances of the offense. The authority
to order a pre-sentence investigation, which had formerly been
limited to felonies, and criminal neglect of family cases, 47 is now
extended to include all misdemeanors. Where no pre-sentence in-
vestigation is ordered, an added paragraph of Section 531 re-
quires a prompt post-sentence investigation with the report sent
to the officer in charge of the correctional institution to which
the defendant has been committed. This means that there will
be a complete investigation and report concerning every con-
victed felon. 4s Where the report is made after sentence is im-
posed it will serve a very valuable purpose as a guide to prison
administrators and in connection with subsequent parole and
pardon hearings.
Where a defendant violates, or is suspected of violating, the
terms of his suspended sentence or probation, there must be
authority for bringing him in for a prompt hearing. Thus Sec-
tion 534A authorizes the court to issue a warrant of arrest for
this purpose. Subsection B empowers the probation officer to
make an arrest, or to authorize a peace officer to make an arrest,
where he "has reasonable cause to believe that a probationer.has
violated or is about to violate a condition of his probation or that
an emergency exists, so that awaiting an order of the court would
create an undue risk." The arrested probationer's rights are
further protected by the provisions in subsection C for a prompt
hearing. At this hearing the court is given much wider latitude
as to possible action than under the prior probation law where
revocation of the probation and reincarceration was the only
stated sanction for a breach.40 Under the new law the sanction
for violation of the conditions of probation or a suspended sen-
tence may consist of a reprimand and warning, intensified super-
46. LA. R.S. 15:534 (3.950).
47. LA. R.S. 15:531 (1950), as amended by La. Act 43 of 1954.
48. The post-sentence investigation is to be made where "the court waives the
investigation as a prerequisite to sentence," thus showing that the requirement is
only intended to apply to felony cases. In dealing with pre-sentence investiga-
tions for felonies, the first paragraph provides for the investigation "unless the
court waives same." Thus paragraphs one and two are logically construed in pari
materia.
49. LA. R.S. 15:533 (1950).
19601
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
vision, the imposition of additional conditions, or revocation of
the probation or suspended sentence. Where the probation or
suspended sentence is revoked, Section 535 continues an express
provision of the 1942 probation law5" that the sentence shall be
served "without credit for time served on probation or under
.suspended sentence."
Sections 536 through 538 provide for suspension of sentence
and probation in misdemeanor cases. Where the offense is crim-
inal neglect of family5 or in other misdemeanors when a sen-
tence "in excess of ninety days" is imposed,5 2 the defendant may
be placed on probation under supervision of the division of pro-
bation and parole supervision subject to much the same terms
-and conditions as in felony cases. A principal difference between
felony and misdemeanor cases, which is a continuation of exist-
ing law, is the fact that in misdemeanor cases the sentence may
be suspended or probation ordered after the defendant "has...
begun to serve the sentence imposed." 53 This provides a desirable
flexibility of sentencing of those convicted of minor crimes
where a pre-sentence investigation is seldom held, and where
release from incarceration should be freely granted to meet
,emergency situations. The use of suspended sentence and proba-
tion in criminal neglect of family cases is specially provided for
in Section 536.1. This separate and rather detailed treatment is
well justified, since suspended sentence and probation is partic-
ularly significant in these cases. It accomplishes the desirable
social result of making sure that the defendant supports his fam-
'ily, a family which would probably be thrown on the already
,crowded relief rolls if he were incarcerated. Outside of the afore-
mentioned changes, the suspension of misdemeanor sentences
follows the prior pattern of the 1942 statute very closely.
Detention and Arrest of Shoplifters
A 1958 statute5 4 provided special authorization for the deten-
tion and possible arrest of shoplifters - a situation which had
been inadequately dealt with in the arrest articles of the 1928
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. While the statute grant-
ed authority to "a peace officer, or a merchant or a merchant's
50. LA. U.S. 15:534 (1950).
.51. LA. R.S. 15:530.1 (Supp. 1960).
52. LA. R.S. 15:536 (1950).
53. Ibid. Contra: LA. R.S. 15:530 (1950) prohibits suspension of sentence or
tthe granting ff probation after the prisoner has begun to serve his sentence.
54. LA. R.S. 15:84.5 and 84.6, enacted by Act No. 301 of 1958.
[Vol. XXI
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specially authorized employee," 55 the clause exempting the person
detaining a suspected shoplifter from civil and criminal liability
for false arrest only granted immunity to a "peace officer."' 6
Act 326 of 1960 amends the immunity clause so that it now em-
braces all who are authorized to arrest or detain suspected shop-
lifters for questioning. Actually the special immunity clause
serves no useful purpose, in either its original or amended form.
If the detention is authorized, as meeting the conditions of the
statute, immunity from both criminal and civil liability will nat-
urally follow. If the detention is unreasonable, or otherwise out-
side the authorization of the statute, there would be no immunity,
with or without the special section.
55. LA. R.S. 15:84.5A (1950).
56. LA. R.S. 15:84.6 (Supp. 1960).
